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 “Technology, MNE’s and Convergence in US and 
European Industrial and Technology Policies.”
Steven McGuire
Abstract
This paper argues that both the EU and the US are evolving largely similar industrial policy
mixes in response to change in the international political economy.  These competitiveness
policies blend liberal deregulation with a renewed commitment to government subsidy and
support in ‘key’ industrial sectors - especially high-technology industries.  The US has thus
retreated from the ‘laissez-faire’ policies long associated with it.  Europe, long more
comfortable with the involvement of the state in economic life, has undertaken deregulation
while seeking to develop technology policies.2
 “Technology, MNE’s and Convergence in US and 
European Industrial and Technology Policies.”
1
Steven McGuire
Introduction
Does the internationalization of high-technology industries lead to a convergence in industrial
policies?  Convergence is once again appearing in politics journals after a period of relative
neglect.   Convergence - the process by which economic activity in states is gradually
2
homogenized - is an economically deterministic concept.  That is, the process occurs naturally
due to the playing out of commercial forces.  Firms are expected to adopt best practices in
the search for survival in global competition; diffusion of an optimum model for international
production is expected.  
3
Technology has an important role to play.  It changes the nature of international business -
the related industrial and trade politics - in various ways.  Technological change and growth
can render national systems of production obsolete.  Modern electronic communications have
eroded the ability of governments to prevent leakage of technology into the international
system.   In any event, national scientific communities find that international exchange is vital
for innovation in national systems.  A ‘go-it-alone’ approach to high-technology R&D may
be self-defeating as it could cut off firms and scientists from important technological
developments occurring elsewhere.
Both the US and the EU are evolving relatively similar policy mixes - but not necessarily
institutions - in response to changes in the International Political Economy.  These influences
include the intellectual and political hegemony of liberalism; growing internationalization of
business; and the increasing salience of technology as a motor of economic growth.  Policies
designed to cope with these pressures emphasize the state’s role as an active supporter of
home firms in international competition.  The changing nature of competition in high
technology goods such as telecommunications, aerospace and computers has exerted
pressures on political establishments in both the EU and the USA.
These industries have distinctive characteristics.  First, on the production side, they are
increasingly characterized by international strategic alliances, as opposed to simple oligopoly.
Second, their products rely on an international-scale marketing effort to recoup their costs.
Those that are ‘intellectual’ in nature - software, film and music production - also benefit from
broadly internationalized standards for transmission.  3
Politically, it is the nature of these industries to produce harmonization pressures on
government. In the US, this has resulted in a greater acceptance of selected government
support for industry.  In Europe, the same pressure has produced a more liberal and nuanced
industrial policy.  The increase in ‘functionally convergent’ multinational enterprises (MNEs)
has put pressure on European and American states to harmonize their regulatory regimes.
It also places Europe and America on the same side of the negotiating table on issues such
as telecoms liberalization in the WTO.
The changing nature of MNE activity
The demands that MNEs make on their home governments are crucially shaped by two
characteristics of the international political economy: economic liberalism and Schumpeterian
competition (competition driven by technological innovation)  The difficulty for MNEs and
states alike is that these two features of the global economy are in some tension with each
other.  Thus, MNE-state relationships are likely to be marked by a considerable degree of
inconsistency on matters of trade, industrial and technology policies as firms attempt to deal
with situations of great uncertainty.    Indeed, the notion of ‘complexity’ is at the heart of
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recent work on the international political economy.   This complexity is seen in the often
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highly sector-specific nature of firm - government relations.  
The triumph of capitalism over communism in the Cold War has led to the hegemony of
liberalism and free trade over - not merely communism - but virtually all forms of social
democracy.   Deregulation and market openness have become the hallmarks of the 1990s.
Firms - even small and medium size companies not typically associated with
internationalization - find that turning to overseas markets has considerable attractions.  Thus
foreign direct investment (FDI) regimes have been steadily liberalized.  State-owned
enterprises are now privatized on the grounds that state ownership is antithetical to the new,
fast-moving era of private, internationalized commerce.  
The triumph of neoliberalism is usually credited to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
consequent elimination of the socialist alternative to capitalism.  However, another
explanation may lie within the capitalist world itself: the clear resurgence of the United States
as the world’s leading economy.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese and German
economic miracles eroded American economic predominance - especially in medium to high
technology sectors.  A virtual cottage industry grew up in American political economy trying
to understand the nature of US decline and the catch-up strategies of other states.   Yet by
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the mid-1990s the talk was of an American economy so dominant in some key technologies
that the word ‘unipolarism’ could again be used to understand the American relationship with
the rest of the world.   One of the explanations advanced for this resurgence is that an
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essentially entrepreneurial American culture has been mated to a fluid, risk-accepting financial
system where venture capital willingly backs speculative forays into high-technology
products.         4
As neo-liberalism has eroded the boundaries between states, it has done more than expand
the opportunities for exporters.  It has also exposed the domestic political economy to the full
force of global competition.  This injection of the international into the domestic explains in
part the increasing emphasis on technology in both the US and Europe.  Some observers have
argued that, faced with low- wage competition, advanced industrialized economies must
move up the value chain and stop competing in labor-intensive markets.  Quite apart from the
effect of international competition, technical change appears to be driving an increased
technological intensity in industrialized states.  The OECD noted a long term trend for the
proportion of all manufacturing exports accounted for by high-technology industries to
increase from 18 per cent in 1980 to 26 per cent in 1993.   Hence the renewed interest in
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technology as an economic driver.  Paradoxically, it is the liberalization of trade which has
provided firms in Europe and America with the justification for renewed government
intervention in the economy.
The rise of so-called Schumpeterian competition in high-technology sectors has arguably
increased the salience of government intervention in support of home firms.  In an increasing
number of sectors, economic advantage is created by human effort and choice rather than
being conferred by natural endowments.  The process of creative destruction requires not the
possession of mineral reserves or vast tracts of land, but active, intelligent and creative
people. Industries such as computers, telecommunications equipment, advanced materials and
aerospace, place an emphasis on globalized firms with deep R&D and production
competencies.  Often these sectors tend toward oligopoly; firms have a vital interest then in
first mover advantages and short product cycle times, as both are designed to pre-empt entry
by competitors.
Schumpeterian competition, with its emphasis on technology intensive industries and the
advantages that innovation can confer on home economies in the form of economic rents and
skilled jobs, invites government intervention to ensure that domestic firms are able to
appropriate some of the benefits of this type of economic activity.  Essentially, the job of the
state is to preserve and promote the international competitiveness of home firms in global
competition. States are responsible for adding value to international production through
providing an infrastructure capable of supporting home firms in the global marketplace.
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Infrastructure also ensures that a country’s firms remain attractive partners for the growing
number of alliances and networks which characterize international business in knowledge-
intensive sectors.   Thus, states are pressured to lower transaction costs associated with
10
international production by a combination of intervention and deregulation.  Drache argues
that this type of policy mix represents a middle ground between the surrender to market
forces represented by free trade and the discredited policy of protectionism.
115
Structure of competitiveness policies Thrust of policy
role of government regulation rather than intervention, acts as
salesman for home MNEs
financial system decline of universal banks in favor of US-style
investment banking; advocacy of venture capital
and ‘alternative’ stock markets for entrepreneurs
favored sectors knowledge-based industries: IT,
pharmaceuticals, financial services, telecoms,
aerospace
nature of state R&D policy support for commercialization of scientific
knowledge rather than curiosity-driven research;
emphasis on knowledge-based sectors
However, while the discussion above suggests the development of a type of techno-national
policy implying discrimination against foreign firms, the reality is more complex.  For
technology, even as it places pressures on government to help home firms, also increases the
need for these firms to access foreign technological capability.  The trans-Atlantic business
relationship is characterized not only by FDI flows, but by expansion of the number of
strategic alliances concluded between US and European firms.  
Alliances are a relatively new and important development in corporate strategy.  The term
itself has been defined in numerous ways and is best viewed as an umbrella term for a variety
of joint-ventures concluded between firms.  However, at one end of the scale are international
strategic alliances (ISAs) - corporate relationships which engage the participating firms in
substantial commitments of assets (capital, technology, personnel) in the pursuit of a long-
term strategic goal.   These ISAs can often endure for years and, indeed, often take on the
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appearance of a separate company.  For instance, CFM International (the aero-engine alliance
between General Electric of the US and the French firm, Snecma), has its own staff, corporate
headquarters and production and marketing arms specifically dedicated to a line of small jet
engines. In short, it has a corporate identity quite separate from the parent firms.  As an Office
of Technology Assessment report points out, such autonomous and long term alliances blur
the nationality of MNEs involved making them,  “increasingly ‘multi’ and less ‘national’”.
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Less far-reaching alliance relationships can include joint ventures or merely developing a
network of firms for the development of a given product.
In a variety of sectors, the pace of technological change has quickened; product life cycle
times in the computer industry, for instance, are often less than two years.    Technology has
a varying impact on manufacturing.  In some industries, it increases productivity, but in
others, it complicates life for the firm as the increasing complexity of production overwhelms
the firm’s organizational capacity.  In this circumstance, the firm cannot remain a master of
all aspects of its product; increasing specialization requires a greater reliance on expert
subcontractors and suppliers.  Increasing technological sophistication has meant that product6
development is now a process of negotiation among several firms.   
Such negotiation reflects a paradox in the political economy of high-technology industries.
In the very sectors where states are preparing their firms for neo-mercantilist economic
warfare, technology makes autarkic strategies very problematic. Technological sophistication
places a premium on the innovative capacity of firms.  This innovative capacity includes not
merely the ability to generate new technologies internally, but also the willingness to augment
proprietary technologies with those of other firms.  Increasing specialization makes it
improbable that a given company can master the various and discrete technologies that go
into a given product, for it implies an increase in the size and scale of research departments
that would not be cost effective.   Thus technologies develop in networks of firms.  One firm
may be central to the development of products - a type of core firm - and is surrounded by
smaller, specialist firms.   The core firm may own the smaller ones, or prefer to maintain an
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independent existence.  Either way, the process of innovation is similar: a type of craft-
industry structure where groups of specialists engage in a process of cooperation over time.
The civil aircraft industry provides a good example of this phenomenon.  Major firms like
Boeing, Airbus or even smaller players like Bombardier find that while they are supposed to
build the plane, the process is rather different.  Modern civil aircraft contain highly
sophisticated sub-systems such as computerized flight controls and cockpits.  Moreover, the
modern plane is composed of numerous materials, including aluminum and carbon fibre.
Faced with developing an increasingly complex product, these firms are in essence brokers
or chief negotiators who, in addition to adding their own technological assets,  essentially co-
ordinate a design and construction effort involving dozens of firms.   Indeed, the program
management skills implied in this role are themselves a valuable competitive asset in modern
defense contracting.   
The computer and biotechnology industries present similar phenomenon. Here products are
the result of co-operation among a network of firms even if the product is branded as one
company’s work.  These specialist networks are developing across the Atlantic.  In the
biotechnology field, European firms have been anxious to tap into the American market.  The
US is considered to be ahead of Europe in most areas of biotechnology.  European
pharmaceutical firms are anxious to build a portfolio of biotechnology products to augment
conventional drugs.  The result has been a spate of takeovers or alliances involving American
and European firms.  Not all such tie-ups occur between large European MNEs and American
start-up companies.  Recently, a young and growing British biotechnology company
purchased two, small US firms.  The company, Oxford Molecular, purchased the two because
of their expertise in the area of computer software designed to assist in drugs development .
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Technological developments also ‘spill over’ into other fields.  Networks can arise when one
company develops a technology that has applications in sectors different from its own.  This
type of complementary technology can lead to the innovating firm becoming the center of  a
dense network of co-operative arrangements. Corning Glass is an example. Its development7
of fibre optic glass led to telecommunications companies seeking the firm out as an alliance
partner.  The same may happen in telecommunications and biotechnology where methods of
16
using biotechnology products to carry signals may be developed.  In another instance, the
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pharmaceutical industry has become interested in the implications of ever more sophisticated
semiconductor chips for its own drug development processes.   New chips are able - because
of their power and small size - to dramatically increase the number and intricacy of
experiments that can be conducted.  The promise of this spillover is reflected in the stake
taken by the Swiss group Roche in a US firm pioneering the relevant chip technology, Caliper
Technologies.
18
In sum, the complex international economy that confronts firms and states places conflicting
pressures on policy: to remain supportive of home industries yet open to the opportunities
offered by foreign firms. The resulting policy mix is thus equally complex.  In characterizing
this mix, I suggest that the United States has ‘tacked back’ toward a policy stance seen from
1930-1950: close government support for the innovative activity of firms.  The EU has, in a
virtual mirror image, continued to liberalize aspects of its innovation-linked policies, while not
abandoning government subsidy and support programs.
American  policies 
The United States has in recent years rediscovered industrial and technology policies. “Re-
discovered” is the vital word here, for during the American industrialization of the 1800s the
US political economy looked very much like the German social-market or Japanese
developmental state.  The American government intervened extensively in industrial
19
development by sanctioning market-sharing practices, aiding industrial research via direct
grants and through an expanding university sector, and otherwise funding infrastructure such
as railways and roads.  However, this interventionist trajectory was successfully and
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spectacularly altered in the early years of the twentieth century.   In a number of industries,
the government reversed its policy bias toward business in favor of one oriented toward the
consumer. The Standard Oil Trust was broken up in response to a public campaign. Banks
were offered the choice of operating as either investment or retail banks, thus destroying the
American version of the German universal bank.  
However, this shift of trajectory did not impede US economic advance; indeed, it may have
been vital to it. As Mowery and Rosenberg argue, anti-trust legislation made it difficult for
firms to abuse market positions and stifle innovation. Firms also chose to merge with rivals
rather than attempt to form cartels. Thus, American firms gained economies of scale and
scope which formed the basis of their global dominance after 1945.  It also reinforced
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characteristics of US firms even before the Sherman Act; American firms tended to rely more
for on their in-house laboratories for R & D and less on government funding than their
European counterparts. 
That said, early American interest in using the state to establish the infrastructure for a8
technologically advanced economy remains a signal feature of that country’s development.
As US firms emerged from the Second World War dominant in their industries, it was easy
to forget the early role of the state and ascribe American success to free market economics.
Thus was born the myth that the US lacked an industrial policy.  The benign environment in
which US firms found themselves after 1945 made it easy for them to believe in the
superiority of this arm’s-length relationship with the state.  Non-Americans too, came to
regard America’s success as a confirmation of the value of laissez-faire, non-interventionist
government.
By the mid-1980s, however, American faith in the arm’s-length relationship between state and
firm was being shaken.  The principal agent of this loss of faith was Japan which was
succeeding in using a type of state-led capitalism to erode American dominance in sector after
sector.  In American eyes, the Japanese succeeded in assaulting sectors of traditional US
dominance - cars being the prime example - as well as newer, knowledge-intensive sectors
such as semiconductors.  This success owed a lot to the Japanese adaptation of American
innovations and the application of the latter to successful products.  Thus US firms and
policymakers became concerned at the inability of the US to apply technological advances to
products in a timely and effective manner.  
Americans were also concerned that their industries were not merely the victims of successful
competitors, but were being targeted by foreign firms operating with the express support of
their home governments.  Japan’s entry into segments of the computer chip market looked
like a predatory effort to drive out all American firms.  “[A] classic strategy of infant-industry
protection ‘worked’ to create a competitive Japanese industry capable of challenging
American supremacy.”  The European aircraft maker Airbus Industrie was likewise seen as
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mounting a direct attack on an industry in which American firms enjoyed overwhelming
dominance.  This perception that international trade was better understood in terms of
economic warfare than through the traditional view that trade was mutually beneficial was
bolstered by new work in economics which had a significant impact on American public policy
in the 1980s and 1990s.
High-technology industries are not sectors where traditional tenets of free trade apply.  High
barriers to entry exist in the form of massive R&D costs and steep learning curves which
make learning-by-doing a necessary, but expensive requirement.  Thus, the industries tend
towards oligopoly and firms operating in these sectors can expect rents, or super-normal
profits, to accrue to them.  Moreover, these knowledge-intensive industries have significant
spillover effects for the rest of the economy.  Their demand for high-technology components
and materials has the effect of driving large sections of the economy up the technological
ladder.  In short, these, industries positively demand government intervention to secure
benefits for the national economy.
Such economic work is bitterly contested by neo-classical economists.  However, the
intellectual case is not the issue: the fact is that large sections of American policymaking and
business circles used “new trade theory” to argue that US policy should, once again, utilize9
interventionist policies to bolster the competitive position of US firms (“New trade theory”
emphasizes the role of government in shaping comparitive advantage, where traditional trade
theory emphasizes natural endowments).  As Milner and Yoffie  show, the trade preferences
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of US firms shifted in the 1980s away from traditional concerns about market access and
toward the creation of level playing fields.  The US state responded by weakening anti-trust
policies toward firm co-operation in research and development and by developing a more
visible salesmanship role for the Department of Commerce department.
Elements of this renewed interest in industrial policy surfaced in the early 1980s when the
American semiconductor industry succeeded in convincing the state that industrial
collaboration should, in certain circumstances, be allowed in the face of competition rules.
The case for collaboration was based on the belief that Japanese success rested on a judicious
blending of competition and cooperation among firms.  Co-operation eliminated the problem
24
of firms wastefully duplicating research efforts.  From the perspective of an individual firm,
co-operation also reduced the risks associated with R&D intensive industries. Single,
undercapitalized firms would not or could not bring new products to market, but co-operative
ventures could.
The 1984 National Co-operative Research Act allowed firms to engage in industrial co-
operative ventures in research and development without fear that such collaboration would
result in anti-trust actions being brought.  One of the most famous ventures developed under
this legislative framework, Sematech, combined the resources of several of the most
competitive American semiconductor firms.  The aim of Sematech was  to develop new
generations of semiconductors that could compete with the Japanese products that US firms
claimed were being dumped in the US market in a deliberate effort to drive US firms out of
the sector.    It was also designed to improve linkages between firms which made chips and
25
those which supplied the equipment for their fabrication.  The separation of innovation from
process technologies was seen as a weakness in the American industry: advanced designs
cannot be built if enabling process technologies do not exist.
26
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the US continue to develop an industrial policy that
sought to improve the competitive position of US firms.   One thrust of these policies was to
lesson the grip that military applications had on the national system of innovation.  Critics
pointed out that, while the US military had provided funding for a large number of
knowledge-intensive products that underpinned US competitiveness, military R&D was no
longer as useful to civilian applications as it had once been.  Military applications required that
products have properties that were simply not relevant to the civilian economy.  Stealth
technology may be very useful for military aircraft, but has no relevance to civil aircraft
design.  Jay Stowsky, for example, blamed the over-specific demands of military production
for the decline of the US numerically-controlled machine tool industry.  Demands were made
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that the share of US government R&D accounted for by the military decline from over 50
percent of the total.  By 1994, however, evidence of a decline was not clear.  According to
one estimate, defense R&D accounted for 55.3 percent of government funding in 1994.
2810
The Clinton administration strengthened the US state’s commitment to an active industrial
policy.   This policy was manifested in the creation of a National Economic Council to
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oversee the competitiveness of the economy.  The Council was deliberately modeled on the
existing National Security Council and was meant to convey the message that ‘economic
security’ was as important as conventional military issues.   The appointment of Laura Tyson
30
as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors was also seen as a manifestation of the new
interventionist mood.  Tyson herself had long advocated industrial policy measures as a means
of countering the unfair trade practices of Japan, the European Union and some LDCs.  
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the new, interventionist attitude was seen in the
American volte-face in the Uruguay Round on the matter of state subsidies.  Here,
longstanding American opposition to the very principle of state funding gave way to an
acceptance, indeed an embracing, of the idea.  European negotiators did not know quite what
to make of the Clinton administration’s eagerness to accept state subsidies.  Commerce
Undersecretary Garten proposed a subsidy regime that was considerably more lax than that
under consideration at the talks, with an extremely generous ceiling on government support
for all types of research.   US negotiators in the GATT Uruguay Round talks sought
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exemptions for research and development subsidies from the proposed WTO subsidy
agreement; the exemption was fought for so as to ‘accommodate planned new [R&D]
programs by the Clinton Administration’.
32
Gourevitch’s suggestion that the US has rediscovered the Hamiltonian tradition of political
economy seems well founded.   However, as noted above, the nature of high-technology
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sectors cautions against the adoption of nationally-based industrial policies.  In the United
States, the sheer size and technological depth of the economy allow the country to develop
discriminatory policies to a greater extent than others.  However, even in the American case,
the highly internationalized nature of business places de facto restraints on the prosecution
of such policies.  As Ham and Mowery argue, “[for] many US firms, access to foreign science
and technology is increasingly important to their competitive future.”   While Sematech was
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an all-American grouping, numerous members of the organization concluded co-operation
agreements with European and Japanese firms.   UNCTAD reports that strategic alliance
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formation is becoming a crucial corporate strategy, in some respects supplanting FDI.
“[C]ooperative agreements between United States firms and foreign firms outweigh the
number of fully owned foreign affiliates by a factor of four.”  In the 1980s, the number of US
36
- European alliances increased by 140 percent in automobiles; 114 percent in biotechnology;
62 percent in information technology and 63 percent in new materials.  Only in chemicals did
the number of alliances decline.    Notice that this increase in alliances happens at exactly the
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same time as the US is developing its new industrial policy initiative.  
The long running Airbus-Boeing dispute illustrates the tensions between techno-nationalism
and technological interdependence contained within current industrial policies.  For the better
part of twenty years, a trans-Atlantic trade war has threatened to erupt over the issue of
subsidies paid by European states to Airbus Industrie.   In 1992, an agreement was reached
that specified the nature and level of permitted subsidy.  Shortly after taking office, President
Clinton indicated American unhappiness with the agreement and briefly threatened to provoke11
a trade conflict.  More recently, the EU has requested that the agreement be reopened for
negotiation. This desire stems from the belief that the accord does not adequately discipline
the provision of indirect subsidy for airline production via defense contracts and other R&D
activities.
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Yet this renewed talk of a trade war is occurring at the same time as European and American
aerospace firms seek further collaboration.  Lockheed Martin, America’s largest defense
aerospace firm, actively sought talks with Airbus Industrie in the wake of Boeing’s merger
with McDonnell-Douglas.  That merger threatened the company’s position in military
aerospace as it would allow Boeing to cross-subsidize its military production with revenues
from civil aircraft sales.  In a cooperative arrangement, Lockheed Martin’s competitive
position vis-a-vis Boeing in the defense field would be enhanced if Airbus Industrie remained
a viable civilian producer.  For its part, Airbus’ plans for a large, 500-seat aircraft would
benefit from Lockheed Martin’s vast experience in large military transports.   This last point
39
once again underlines the potential benefits of eschewing technological autarky in favor of
aligning with foreign firms possessing specific technologies.
The US has moved away from the free market orientation that characterized its public policy
during the early post-war period.  The US government has reacted to perceptions that its
partners were trading unfairly, especially in sectors characterized by Schumpeterian
competition (competition based on technological advance).  The reaction was to try and
develop a more interventionist and discriminatory industrial policy.   However, the nature of
technology also restrains this nationally-orientated policy.  US firms continue to explore and
develop links with European firms.  Such links are vital to the continued competitiveness of
American companies.
European Initiatives
The recent history of European technology and industrial policy has witnessed a shift in that
policy away from state ownership and “national champion” strategies and toward a type of
sponsorship model that emphasizes government support for R&D and infrastructure such as
education and transport.  This policy shift was brought about by two events: the obvious
failure of national champion strategies, and the successful penetration of the European
market, especially in electronics, by Japanese firms.  The current policy mix is consistent with
our theme: it displays a mix of liberal deregulation with Schumpeterian support for innovation
by firms.  
European industrial and technology policies have long been framed by the perception that
Europe was falling behind the US and the Japanese in technology.   One early attempted
solution was to create national champions. These firms, usually created by the government-
sponsored merger of smaller firms, would enjoy a dominant position in a given national
market and thus reap economies of scale benefits.   However, the protection afforded these
firms gave the wrong series of incentives: the policy produced inefficient, non-innovative12
firms which were unable to cope with the dynamism of Japanese or American competitors.
By the early 1980s, American computer producers held 80 per cent of the European market.
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Policy failure highlighted the need to expose European firms to greater competition: this
could be achieved in the first instance by creating a proper European market.  The Single
Market Program was the liberal response to the poor competitiveness of European firms.
Creation of the unified market would allow European firms to reap the same scale economies
that the American market provided for US firms decades earlier.
However, the Japanese challenge in both automobiles and  electronics sent a different set of
signals. Industrial policy for knowledge-intensive sectors could be a successful policy and
should not be discarded.  What was needed was a commitment to the support of so-called
sunrise industries in preference to traditional sectors such as steel and a greater emphasis on
developing infrastructure for knowledge-intensive sectors.    Thus, at both the national and
41
EU level, new policies designed to bolster the competitiveness of European firms were
developed.  Among the most active supporters of a new industrial policy for the European
Union were major European multinationals - especially those in the fields of computers, office
equipment and electronics.   These firms organized the European Roundtable, in a high profile
effort to press the Commission for a more integrated and effective industrial and technology
policy.  
The Community’s response was to create the Framework Programs which sought to
encourage collaboration among European Union firms.  As in the US, the aim of programs
was to lower the risk of innovation for a given firm and to aid in the diffusion of new
technologies and knowledge.  The EU “has [the Commission argues] an excellent scientific
base but it is less successful than others in converting its competence into new products and
market shares; this is especially true in high-technology sectors.”
42
In 1990, the Commission articulated its ‘new approach’ to industrial policy matters.  Its
43
paper formally signaled the Commission’s embrace of innovation policy as the centrepiece of
future initiatives.   As Jovanovic notes, the 1990 initiative signaled the embrace of a policy
designed to assist firms in coping with change rather than trying to preserve their existing
competitive status; the aim, in short, was for an ‘adjustment friendly’ program.
44
The Maastricht Treaty granted the Commission the power under a revised Article 130(h) to
act in ‘strengthening the scientific and technological bases of Community industry and
encouraging it to become more competitive at the international level’.   This signaled a shift
45
in emphasis in public funding away from curiosity-driven research and toward applied work.
 The initial Commission proposals for the Fifth Framework Program, due to run from 1999 -
2002, called for funding to be aimed at ‘initiatives focused on industry that will help boost
competitiveness and jobs’.   At least some member states agreed with this  new approach.
46
The UK’s early submission in the consultation stage of Framework Five called for the
program to enhance the competitiveness of European firms by addressing the ‘medium-term
technological needs’ of EU firms.
4713
In the area of finance, recent developments in the EU indicate a greater willingness - indeed,
desire in some quarters - for the development of an American-style venture capital industry
to support European high-technology firms.   As some economists have argued, high levels
of European unemployment may reflect not only labor market rigidities, but also a lack of
demand for labor due to the relative absence of entrepreneurial activity.  Two related factors
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may be cited as contributing to this lack of demand-side ‘pull’ for new labor.  First, excessive
regulation, including restrictive zoning practices and punitive taxation, hamper the
development of new businesses.  Perhaps as a result of this, a second factor has arisen: the
unwillingness of European-based finance capital to act as venture capitalists.   As the OECD
notes, California  alone raised more venture-capital finance in 1996 ($3.7 billion) than the UK,
France and Germany combined ($ 3.2 billion).
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Consistent with our argument,  recent European efforts seek to emulate American success in
supporting risky investments in start-up companies and new technologies. The Commission’s
1995 Green Paper called for greater risk-taking by financiers: a firm acknowledgment that
new industrial policy is tightly linked to the financial system.   While the Commission noted
that Europe’s venture capital industry had made great improvements during the 1990’s, much
more needed to be done. Barriers to further venture-capital investment needed to be removed.
Further, the conservative nature of many investments must be shifted in favor of investment
in new, unproven firms.  The paper noted that in 1994, only 10 per cent of investment was
in high-technology sectors and that start-ups were eschewed in favor of existing firms, often
in medium or low-technology areas.  In November 1997, European finance ministers agreed
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to develop a £284 million fund for SME development.  One aim of the fund is to act as a
venture capitalist for small and medium enterprises.  In Europe’s biggest economy, a
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growing lobby developed arguing for a more deregulated, American-style financial system.
Roman Herzog, the German president, stated that the cure to Germany’s employment malaise
might lie in adopting aspects of the US financial system.
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In another shift toward a deregulated capital market supportive of innovative activity,
European stock markets have shown a greater willingness to act as financiers for SME’s via
public flotations.  In the biotechnology sector, for example, the London Stock Exchange
eased listing rules in a deliberate effort to attract new firms on to the exchange.    Easdaq,
53
a new European exchange modeled on the Nasdaq, is also providing an avenue for new
biotechnology - as well as other - firms.  
Tensions remain between the stated policy of fostering European competitiveness and
globalization.  The ‘Europeanization’ of industrial policy has not led to the abandonment of
internationalizing strategies by MNEs; indeed, such strategies are central to their success.
Archibugi and Michie point out that in three technological areas, European firms show a
higher propensity to cooperate with American partners than European.  In the fields of
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biotechnology, new materials, and information technology, “intra-European joint-ventures
amount to 19 percent [of collaborative arrangements concluded world-wide] while European-14
US ones amount to 21 percent.”  Technology has again played a role here.  European firms
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find that they must access the US technological base via collaborative agreements with US
firms.  
In the early stages of the construction of EU-level policies, the Roundtable firms accepted
that a degree of discrimination against foreign firms would be necessary.  However, van
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Apeldoorn argues that this European orientation within the Roundtable has been superseded
by a globalist perspective which sees neoliberal deregulation as the solution to Europe’s
competitiveness problem.   But why would firms prefer this solution?  They prefer it because
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in knowledge-intensive industries the cost of developing your own technology may be
prohibitive compared to acquiring it through international strategic alliances.  Liberalism
ensures that firms continue to have access to foreign technology.   Thus, there is no necessary
contradiction between the pursuit of a European industrial policy and neoliberalism. Indeed,
foreign technology, accessed through alliances, can enhance European competitiveness.  The
same need for access also places limits on the ability of the Commission or member states to
close off foreigners from research and development programs.  In the UK, foreign-owned
aerospace firms such as Short Brothers are not barred from participation in UK programs.
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Similarly, the Framework Programs are able to accommodate foreign research partners,
subject to some limitations.  Edith Cresson has recently emphasized the need for European
research efforts to be open to greater involvement of non-member states - although
preference may be  given to the Central and Eastern European Countries.
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Conclusion
This paper has argued that changes in the international business environment have presented
the US and the EU with the same problem: how to ensure the competitiveness of national
firms in high-technology sectors.   Firms in these sectors offer states the promise of high-
paying jobs, a vibrant research base and, if new trade theory is to be believed, the
accumulation of economic rents.  These attractions offer states powerful incentives to develop
discriminatory industrial policies designed to favor home firms.  Both the US and the EU have
developed such programs. 
However, these same industries also place a premium on non-discriminatory policy regimes.
The enormous costs of research and development push firms to co-operate as a means of
spreading the cost - and the risk - of R&D.  Increasing complexity also means that firms are
incapable of developing all the requisite technologies for certain products.  Thus, products
are developed by networks of firms with each company bringing some technology or other
asset to the group.    In this circumstance, firms are attractive because they possess specialist
knowledge.   In this situation, the worst outcome for  a firm is to be cut off from technology,
even foreign technology.  As Ham and Mowery point out, technological interdependence is
now well established and unwinding it is both improbable and damaging.  Thus, an open
60
international business environment is the preferred option.15
1. This is a revised version of a paper given at the European Community Studies Association
conference in Seattle, May 31- June 2, 1997.  The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
the British Academy Conference Travel Grant Scheme, which provided funding for this project.
Also due thanks are the participants in the ECSA panel on EU-US relations, particularly Kalypso
Nicolaidis, for comments on the original version of the paper.
2. Suzanne Berger “Introduction” in Berger and Dore (eds), National Diversity and Global Capitalism
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.5.
3. Ibid.
4. Jonathan Crystal, “International Firms, Strategic Trade, and Reciprocity”, paper presented at the
International Studies Association annual meeting, Toronto, 18-22 March, 1997)
5. John de la Monthe and Gilles Pacquet, “Evolution and Inter-Creation: The Government-Business-
Society Nexus”, in John de la Monthe and Gilles Pacquet (eds), Evolutionary Economics and the
New International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 31-61.
6. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press,  1987); John Zysman, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Paul
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Harper Collins, 1988).
7. Jens Van Scherpenberg, “Transatlantic Competition and European Defense Industries: A New Look
at the trade - defense linkage”, International Affairs, Vol.73, No.1, Winter 1997, p.118. 
8. OECD, “Technology and Industrial Performance”, OECD Observer, No.204, March 1997, pp.6-10,
figure 5.
9. Margaret Sharp, “Technology, Globalization and Industrial Policy”, in M. Talalay, C. Farrands, and
R. Tooze (eds.), Technology, Culture and Competitiveness: Change and the World Political
Economy (London: Routledge, 1997), p.101; Tony Buxton, Paul Chapman and Paul Temple (eds),
Britain’s Economic Performance, 2   Edition (London: Routledge, 1998).
nd
10. Steven McGuire, “National Policy for Internationalized Industries: Neo-liberal Interventionism and
the UK Aerospace Industry”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.4, No.2, June 1997, pp.190-
205.
11. Daniel Drache, “From Keynes to K-Mart: Competitiveness in a Corporate Age”, in Robert  Boyer
and Daniel Drache (eds), States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization, (London: Routledge,
1996) pp.31-61. 
12. Office of Technology Assessment, Multinationals and the National Interest: Playing by Different
Rules (Washington: USGPO, 1993), p.117.
13. Ibid.
14. W. Ruigrok and R. van Tulder, The Logic of Global Restructuring (London: Routledge, 1995).
15. Financial Times, 9 May, 1997, p. 21.
16. Robert Van Tulder and Gerd Junne, European Multinationals in Core Technologies (London: John
Wiley & Sons, 1988), pp.218-219.  
17. Ibid.
17. Financial Times,  25 March 1997, www.ft.com.  
18. Peter Gourevitch, “The Macro Politics of Micro Institutional Differences in the Analysis of
Comparative Capitalism” , Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (eds.), National Diversity and Global
Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 239-240.  
19. Ibid.
20. David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.106.
21. Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Who is Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High Technology Sectors,
(Washington: Washington Institute for International Economics, 1992), p.86. 
22. Helen Milner and David Yoffie, “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and
a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands”, International Organization, Vol.43, No. 2, Spring 1989,
pp.239-272.
NOTES16
23. Mark Lieberman, “The Importance of Technology Transfer and Commercialization to US
Competitiveness” , Gibson and Smilor, (eds), Technology Transfer in Consortia and Strategic
Alliances (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), p. 3.  
24. Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Who is Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High Technology Sectors,
(Washington: Washington Institute for International Economics, 1992), p.108.
25. Ibid., p.153; Gary Pisano and Steven Wheelwright, “High-Tech R&D”, Harvard Business Review,
Vol.73, No.5, September-October 1995, pp.93-105.
26. Jay Stowsky, “From Spin-Off to Spin-On: Redefining the Military’s Role in American Technology
Development” in Wayne Sandholtz et al., The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the
Next Security System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
27. Office of National Statistics, “Research and Experimental Development (R&D) Statistics 1994",
Economic trends, No.514, August, 1996, table 21.
28. Lewis Branscomb, (ed.), Empowering Technology: Implementing a US Strategy (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1993).
29. John Peterson, Europe and America: The Prospects for Partnership, (2  edition), (London:
nd
Routledge, 1996), p. 81.
30. Hugo Paeman and Alexandra Bensch, From the GATT to the WTO: The European Community in
the Uruguay Round (Leuven: University of Leuven Press, 1995), p.160.
31. Sylvia Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System: Who’s on First? (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1997), p.182.    
32. Peter A. Gourevitch, “Political and Institutional Differences in Comparative Capitalism”, in Berger
and Dore (eds), National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1996), p.256.
33. Rose Marie Ham and David Mowery, “Enduring Dilemmas in US Technology Policy”, California
Management Review, Vol.37, No.4 Summer 1995, p. 92, emphasis added.
34. Ibid.
35. UNCTAD, World Investment Report (Geneva and New York: United Nations, 1994), p.140. 
36. Ibid., Table III.12.
37. Financial Times, 3 May 1997: www.ft.com.
38. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 5 May 1997, pp. 20-21.  
39. “Research and Development Policy” in Kassim, Hussein and Anand Menon (eds.), The European
Union and National Industrial Policy (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 228). 
40. Margaret Sharp and Keith Pavitt, “Technology Policy in the 1990s: Old Trends and New Realities”,
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31, No.2, June 1993, p.135.  
41. European Commission, Green Paper on Innovation, Supplement 5, 1995 (Luxembourg: Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996).   
42. Miroslav Jovanovic, European Economic Integration: Limits and Prospects (London: Routledge,
1997), p.190.  
43. Jovanovic, 1997, p.190.  
44. Christopher Dent, The European Economy: The Global Context (London: Routledge, 1997), p.328,
my emphasis.   
45. Financial Times, 31 July 1997, p.2.   
46. European Commission, Green Paper on Innovation, Supplement 5, 1995 (Luxembourg: Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities), p.5.
47. Alan Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke, “Observations and Conjectures on the US Employment
Miracle”, Working Paper 6146 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997); Financial Times,
13 October 1997, p.21.  
48. Economist, 6 December 1997, p.159.  
49. European Commission, 1995, p.39, see also, CE, “Capital for Exploiting Research Results”,
Innovation and Technology Transfer, Brussels, DGXII, April 1997, p.11).  
50. Financial Times, 7 November 1997, p.2.   
51. Financial Times, 10 November, 1997, p.3.  17
52. Financial Times, 15 May 1997, p.21.
53. D. Archibugi and J. Michie, “The Globalization of Technology: a New Taxonomy” in D. Archibugi
and J. Michie (eds.), Technology, Globalization and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997, p.183.  
54. Ibid.  
55. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, “Transnationalism and European Transformation: Contending Social
Forces in the Construction of ‘Embedded Liberalism’”, paper presented at the International Studies
Association annual meeting, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997, p. 22.   
56. Ibid., p.23.  
57. Steven McGuire, “National Policy for Internationalized Industries: Neo-liberal Interventionism and
the UK Aerospace Industry”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.43, No.2, June 1997, pp.190-
205.
58. European Commission, 1996.
59. Rose Marie Ham and David Mowery, “Enduring Dilemmas in US Technology Policy”, California
Management Review, Vol. 37, No.4, Summer 1995, p. 92.  